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Abstract This paper studies the current ‘identity cri-
sis’ caused by the substantial security, privacy and us-
ability shortcomings encountered in existing systems
for identity management. Some of these issues are well
known, while others are much less understood. This
paper brings them together in a single, comprehensive
study and proposes recommendations to resolve or to
mitigate the problems. Some of these problems can-
not be solved without substantial research and devel-
opment effort.
Keywords Identity management · federation ·
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1 Introduction
Identity management consists of the processes and all
underlying technologies for the creation, management,
and usage of digital identities. In practice, it covers the
process of establishing the identity of a remote user
(or system), managing access to services by that user,
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and maintaining identity profiles concerning that user.
As such, identity management is an essential compo-
nent for the successful development and growth of the
next, so-called “2.0”, user-centric Internet services. Se-
cure, reliable and user friendly identity management is
also considered fundamental in establishing trust, for
instance in e-commerce applications [13].
Unfortunately, identity management is also a con-
fusing concept, mainly because the different stakehold-
ers involved (users, service providers, and others) have
different views and requirements. This has resulted in
quite a number of different approaches towards provid-
ing identity management. Several competing systems
exist, most of which are in fact under active develop-
ment. Their features change from time to time, adding
to the confusion surrounding identity management.
The historic development of identity management
partly explains how this confusion arose. The scope of
identity management used to be on a single organisa-
tion, managing a limited set of services and employees,
specific to one application or ICT platform. Currently
this is no longer true. Organisations deliver ICT ser-
vices to their customers and employees of other organ-
isations as well. This turns identity management into
a complex process that has to deal with many applica-
tions spanning multiple organisations, instead of one
application within one organisation.
The user perspective has also grown in importance.
With the increasing presence of organisations on the
Internet, and with the creation of a slew of web appli-
cations like social networks, web 2.0 mash-ups and the
like, users start having their own demands for identity
management on the web as well (cf. [22,20]). For them,
managing and remembering a large number of different
user accounts on such web sites is cumbersome. Enter-
ing name, address and phone number over and over
2again with every e-commerce site should be avoided.
And finally, the identity management systems to sup-
port their use of web applications in a variety of con-
texts should be privacy friendly.
Current systems for identity management do not
satisfy these requirements yet. Apart from the fact that
properly implementing an identitymanagement system
spanning multiple organisations is very complex, the
design of current identity management systems is al-
ready broken at a more fundamental level. They suffer
from several shortcomings that need to be addressed
before they can be considered truly secure, privacy friendly
and usable. Some of these issues are well known, while
others are much less understood. This paper brings
them together in a single, comprehensive study and
proposes recommendations to resolve or to mitigate
them, in order to end the current identity crisis.
1.1 Reading guide
The paper is organised as follows. Sect. 2 gives a short
overview of identity management and the state of the
art in identity management research. In Sect. 3 we de-
scribe fundamental shortcomings in current identity
management designs. These concern the concept of iden-
tity itself, and the sometimes implicit trust assump-
tions on which these designs are based. We continue
our investigation discussing security (Sect. 4), privacy
(Sect. 5) and usability (Sect. 6) issues, and wrap up with
an overview of our conclusions and recommendations
in Sect. 7.
2 On Identity management
Identity management (or IdM for short), consists of the
processes and all underlying technologies for the cre-
ation, management, and usage of digital identities. In
a typical identity management system we can distin-
guish three parties: users, identity providers and rely-
ing parties1. The user (U) requests a service from the
Relying Party (RP) that relies on the Identity Provider
(IdP) to provide authentic information about the user.
These are three technical components, which cannot be
held legally accountable. We therefore use the notion of
domain to represent a legal entity (an organisation or
individual person), that is responsible and accountable
for the activities of a technical component.
In this paper we loosely define identity as follows.
The identity of an entity within a scope is the set of all
1 Relying parties are also known as service providers (SP).
characteristics (also called attributes) that have been at-
tributed to this entity within that scope [19]. An identi-
fier uniquely identifies an entity (a person, a computer,
an organisation, etc.) within a specific scope. We will
come back to this distinction later on in Sect. 3.1.
Several types of identity management systems ex-
ist [27,30]. We choose to make the distinction between
network-based identity management and claim-based
identity management (see Fig. 1), because their differ-
ence in architecture has an impact on the security, pri-
vacy and usability issues associatedwith them (cf. [34]).
In a network-based IdM system, the procedure to
access a service and to determine the identity and at-
tributes of the visiting user roughly runs as follows.
When the user visits the RP, the RP asks the user to
authenticate himself at the IdP. The IdP performs this
authentication, and if successful gives the user a token
that the user forwards to the RP. The RP verifies the
token, and if valid, accepts the user as authenticated.
To obtain further identity information about the user,
the RP contacts the IdP directly, using the token as a
pointer to the user profile stored by the IdP. In some
cases, the user mediates this exchange of information
between IdP and RP.
Examples of network-based identitymanagement sys-
tems are OpenID2, the Liberty Alliance3, and Shibbo-
leth4.
In claim-based IdM systems a RP specifies the user
information it needs in order to grant the user access.
The user decides if and how it will comply with that re-
quest, by obtaining so-called claims from IdPs. A claim
is a statement about a user (similar to an attribute as-
sertion in SAML 2.0), expressed (and signed) by an IdP.
To obtain such claims, the user needs to authenticate
himself to the IdP, and after receiving the claim from
the IdP the user forwards the claim to the RP.
The crucial difference with network-based IdM sys-
tems is that there is no direct exchange of information
between RP and IdP, giving the user more control over
the exchange of his identity information. Even though
there exist policy tools such as uApprove5 for network-
based IdM systems that allow a user to deny or give
consent to releasing his attributes to a RP, the actual
attribute assertion exchange still takes place by the RP
and IdP communicating with each other directly.
Examples of claim-based identity management sys-
tems are the Identity Metasystem (Windows CardSpace)
[9,26], and more privacy friendly concepts from the
2 http://openid.net/developers/specs/
3 http://www.projectliberty.org/
4 http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/
5 Developed for Shibboleth by SWITCH: http://www.switch.
ch/aai/support/tools/uApprove.html
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Fig. 1 Types of identity management systems.
academic community like Idemix [6,5] and U-Prove [4].
In the latter two cases, claims are in fact anonymous,
and are not transferred to the RP directly. Instead, the
statement in the claim is proven to the RP in a zero-
knowledge fashion. This further protects the user’s pri-
vacy, because it makes the user unlinkable between two
interactions with a relying party.
Themain points raised in this paper apply to all cur-
rent types of identity management systems, although
to claim-based approaches to a lesser extent. In general
claim based approaches exhibit less privacy issues, and
have a slightly better security and usability profile.
2.1 Federated identity management
The concept of federated identity management is some-
times cause for confusion. At times the term is used to
describe the collaboration of several RPs to use a single
IdP, all within the same domain. In our view such a setup
is the standard form of identity management, where no
real federation takes place. Instead, federated identity
management is a setup where identity is shard across
domains [25,18]. Within such a federation, additional
agreements can be made for further optimisation, e.g.
to have a centralised authentication authority. The so-
called circle of trust (CoT) equals the set of domains
that belong to one federation. Note that a domain can
belong to several federations and therefore can belong
to several circles of trust. Fig. 2 shows the differences.
Example federations are national education and re-
search federations based on Shibboleth (e.g. Austria’s
SWITCH, UK Federation, Australian’s AAF, USA’s InCom-
mon), or Liberty Alliance (Geofederation). Much work is
undertaken on inter-federation: technologies and poli-
cies to allow users from one federation to be accepted
by another federation. This takes place both technolog-
ically, e.g. Microsoft’s Geneva inter-operates with Shib-
boleth, and on a policy level, to let e.g. national research
federations share resources6.
2.2 Related work
Several other studies have stressed the importance of
privacy, security and usability of identity management,
each focusing on specific issues or looking at the prob-
lem from a particular perspective.
Pfitzmann and Hansen [33] have been collecting and
developing a consolidated terminology about the fun-
damental concepts in relation to digital identity and
identifiability since 2000; the evolving paper is currently
at its 34th version.
Public awareness aboutwhat private information can
be stored and resold by RPs is very low and the cus-
tomers’ view is more optimistic than reality according
to the survey by Turow et al. [36] Nevertheless, cus-
tomers do care about their private data and they are
willing to take privacy into consideration in purchas-
ing decisions when information about the privacy state-
ment of the retailer is easily accessible and sufficiently
user friendly [35].
Paul De Hert [12] argues that a paradigm shift is nec-
essary in connection with private data. Retailers, gov-
ernments and other organisations have to accept that
private information is ultimately owned by the individ-
ual who has to be assigned the control over her pri-
vate data. Privacy has to be a part of the legal frame-
work as well as when designing new systems that com-
prise personal data. The fundamental technical means,
6 see TERENA REFEDs at http://www.terena.org/
activities/refeds/
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the cryptographic tools, are available to build privacy-
enhancing systems with anonymous but accountable
users [6,4].
Privacy itself also raises many questions to study.
Recent endeavours show the different aspects that iden-
tity management has to take into consideration. Pear-
son [31] collects design guidelines for cloud comput-
ing services with proper privacy protection and she de-
scribes some open questions (e.g. policy enforcement,
determination of data processor, constructing privacy
design patterns). Another emerging research field is the
challenge of building life-long privacy [32] that includes
the expansion of solutions tomost areas in life and very
long-term data security too.
Dhamija andDusseault [14] provide guidelines about
how to design a decentralised web identity manage-
ment system that will take all participants’ motivation
as well as their capabilities into account. They assert
that the usability aspect is essential in order to achieve
wide acceptance and secure usage of such a system, al-
lowing users to take appropriate privacy decisions.
Although federated identity management solutions
are widely employed in corporate and academic envi-
ronments, many problems still arise. These systems can
provide convenient user functions (such as single sign-
on or automated form-filling), however, the single layer
of authentication decreases system security [1] while it
increases the value of user credentials (as it provides
access to more resources) [14].
One of the most challenging research tasks is how
to build a privacy-friendly IMS with good usability prop-
erties. Technical research recommends usable privacy-
enhancing solutions. Josang et al. [20] proposes a scheme
that includes a personal authentication device (PAD)
that claims to be able to support both secure single
sign-on and protection against phishing attacks. A sim-
ilar tool, a “smart client”, is predicted to gain increas-
ing importance that assists the discovery of appropriate
IdPs in complex federated systems [25]. In the European
PRIME project Camenisch et al. [7] developed an elab-
orate system that providesmore control for users about
their personal data by automated negotiation processes.
Eclipse’s Higgins7 — with a practical open-source ap-
proach — is a project in progress that is aiming for
implementing a user-centered identity framework for
diverse platforms with a consistent user interface.
Ongoing research in IdM encountersmany challenges
concerning the balance among security, privacy, usabil-
ity. A suitable legal framework is required that works
together with technical solutions [12] and which pro-
vides liability incentives [24] for stakeholders. A usable
solution for mutual authentication is still to be devel-
oped in which not only users are required to provide
credentials but IdPs and RPs are also authenticated to
the users [20,24].
The Future of Identity in the Information Society
(FIDIS)8 Network of Excellence provides a wealth of in-
formation on the topic, see for instance [27] for a sys-
tematic review of current systems for identity manage-
ment. Based on their experiences within that project,
Cameron et al. [10] propose a framework for a user
centric, privacy friendly, IdM, with a focus on ensur-
ing interoperability. Their proposal is very much in line
with the US National Strategy for Trusted Identities in
Cyberspace [13].
3 Fundamental issues
There are several fundamental problems with identity
management systems that arise from the illusive na-
ture of the concepts of identity and trust. Also, too lit-
7 http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/
8 http://www.fidis.net
5tle consideration has been given to the different types
of access rights that must be enforced through iden-
tity management, as they prove to have an impact on
the trust relationships between the parties involved. Be-
cause of their fundamental nature, these issues apply to
all currentmodels of identitymanagement, and not just
the current implementation of suchmodels. We discuss
these issues in this section.
3.1 What is identity?
We first turn to the concept of identity itself (cf. [3]).
Note that identity is not absolute. An identity de-
scribes an entity (a person, a computer, an organisation,
etc.) within a specific scope. More formally: The identity
of an entity within a scope is the set of all characteris-
tics that have been attributed to this entity within that
scope (cf. [19]). For example, you may have one iden-
tity within the scope of your job, containing informa-
tion such as your employee number, and another iden-
tity within the scope of your family, containing infor-
mation on the food you like. Identities are therefore
only valid within a specific scope. If an identity con-
tains many characteristics, it may uniquely identify a
particular entity within a scope. However, with only a
few attributes, many entities are likely to match.
It immediately follows that entities have, in general,
multiple identities. These identities may partly overlap,
but can also be mutually inconsistent. One of the au-
thors has blue eyes in all scopes, but may go by differ-
ent names, nicknames, in different scopes. In extreme
cases, people are known to live parallel lives. Some-
times, hardly anybody knows that particular identities
in different scopes belong to the same entity.
Identity is not unique. Even within a single scope,
people may have several different identities. Within the
scope of a family a person may not only be a father (to
his children) but also a husband (to his wife). Moreover,
the identity of an entity is perceived differently by dif-
ferent people, or perceived differently by the same peo-
ple at different times or in different contexts. Someone
may be trusted by one person, but not by another, or
only within a certain context.
To uniquely identify entities, one needs to rely on
identifiers, not on identities. This distinction between
identity and identifier is important, and not always prop-
erly understood. The confusion is understandable, be-
cause in common parlance identity is almost synony-
mous with personal name, which in turn is understood
to be a unique identifier. Note that also identifiers (such
as a user name) are only valid and guaranteed to be
unique within a scope.
Virtual identities, in the virtual world, can be con-
nected to entities in the real world, but this connec-
tion may be loose. For example, computers behind an
IP address may be replaced. Ownership of game charac-
ters or avatars may be transferred between people over
time. In fact, there is quite a large amount of trade in
such virtual identities. Likewise, functional roles within
companies may look, to external observers, as entities
with a particular identity, but different people may ac-
tually be assigned to such a role over time.
Identity is also dynamic. Assertions about someone’s
age change when time passes. Your financial situation
changes over time, so do your friendships, your convic-
tions and beliefs. Identity management systems must
deal with such changes efficiently, andmust avoid keep-
ing old invalid data.
Identities may exist long after an entity ceases to ex-
ist. The lifetime of an identity does not correspond to
the lifetime of the associated entity. Most of the time
identity information is not updated or deleted after it
has become inapplicable. This introduces a privacy risk.
But sometimes claims about an entity actually need to
be kept long after the entity itself disappears. For ac-
countability reasons, relying parties store usage infor-
mation for a period of time, sometimes several years.
The situation is reminiscent to the difference in life-
times between keys and certificates (themselves a pos-
sible part of an identity). A certificate needs to be kept
long after the key it certifies has expired, to allow par-
ties to verify the signatures made with that key.
Identity is not only what you want to reveal about
yourself, but also what others conclude, believe, and
find out about yourself. In fact most of a person’s iden-
tity is of this type. Such data may be wrong, become
invalid over time, be misrepresented, or be misguiding,
etc. In other words, an identity does not necessarily cor-
respond to reality. Moreover, it shows that an identity
has many owners: it is not only owned by the entity it
describes, but also collected and owned by others. A
fine example of this are your health care records that
are being collected by GPs, specialists and other health
care personnel. Health records are owned by (and the
responsibility of) the GP. Youmay have the right to view
them, but you don’t necessarily have the right to change
them. This has important privacy ramifications.
Instead of an entity having one single identity con-
taining all characteristics taken from all scopes, it is
more natural to view an entity as a collection of multi-
ple identities (a set of sets), each with their own scope.
Note that this aligns with the idea that privacy ensures
that information about a person does not leak from one
scope into another.
6When scopesmerge (e.g. if organisationsmerge) iden-
tities may clash. If an entity has an identity in both
scopes they may not get merged at all, and as a result
the new scope perceives two entities where there is only
one. For example, a person may have an account with
two different RPs, which require the user to use differ-
ent IdPs. How to determine what an entity’s identity is
in the new scope when the two RPs merge? Or when the
two IdPs merge?
The fact that identities remain to exist long after the
entity ’dies’ can result in a wealth of personal informa-
tion stored in many places, leading to privacy risks for
users that are somehow related to this entity. It may
also result in IdPs giving out incorrect claims, damag-
ing their reputation of a trusted partner that needs to be
right always. Furthermore, claims (that link some iden-
tity information to an identifier) may continue to exist
indefinitely, even after the identity information itself is
deleted. When the claim of an old identity still exists
and a new identity is created with the same identifier,
these two may seem to refer to the same entity, while
this is not the case.
Managing identities does not only mean handling
new and fixed identities within one scope, but also han-
dling the complex situations of changing identities in
changing scopes, and managing the different percep-
tions of identity within the same scope. This is a chal-
lenge.
Recommendation A proper model for identity underly-
ing identitymanagement should be developed, and IdPs
and RPs should make explicit how that model applies
to their systems of identity management.
Identitymanagement systems should distinguish be-
tween the lifetime of an identity, and the lifetime of
claims derived from that identity. They should also pro-
vide a way to remove obsolete identities (or part of
identities) and to invalidate out-of-date claims. Iden-
tity management systems should use proper identifiers
that satisfy the requirements from Joosten et al. [19].
To deal with dynamic identity aspects, it would be
convenient if a person could get an attribute certificate
for, for example, the date of birth, which could then be
used to prove that the person is older than 18 (without
revealing the real age). An example implementation of
such a system is Idemix [5].
3.2 Different types of access
Identitymanagement systems are being used to enforce
different kinds of access rights. These access rights have
different risk profiles, and therefore assume different
trust relationships between users, identity providers and
relying parties. Unfortunately, users as well as system
designers are unaware of this difference in access rights.
This results in unacceptable risks.
The essential distinction one needs to make is be-
tween membership and ownership of a resource.
Identity management systems were first applied in
organisations (to centralise access rights management
to business applications) and education (to grant stu-
dents access to the wireless network, the digital library
and the computing facilities). In both cases, the identity
management systems are used for deciding whether a
certain user is a member of a group. In the first case it
decides whether the user is a member of the group that
has access to some business application. In the second
case it decides whether the user is a student of a certain
university. The resource being controlled is not owned
by the user, and any risks or resource damage due to
using the identity management system lies completely
with the relying party, not the user.
More and more, identity management systems are
also being used to enforce ownership of a resource. The
prime example is on-line banking, and to a lesser ex-
tent email, chat, blog and social networking accounts.
Illegal access to your bank account will hit you with a di-
rect financial loss. Access to your email, chat and other
systems may enable a criminal to ’steal’ your identity,
which may hurt you in many other ways. In this case,
the risk of using the identity management systems lies
completely with the user.
How does this affect the use of identity manage-
ment systems? To enforce membership, identity man-
agement needs to assume different trust relationships
than to enforce ownership. In the first case, the relying
party needs to trust the identity provider to reliably au-
thenticate its members. In the second case, it is the user
that needs to trust the identity provider to reliable au-
thenticate himself. These trust relationships need to be
enforced either by technological means, or throughmu-
tual agreements like service level agreements (SLA) with
associated penalties. In either case, an identity manage-
ment system to enforce membership is inherently dif-
ferent from an identity management system to enforce
ownership.
Also the risk level associated with using identity
management differs. In the case of granting students
access to university resources, the damage associated
with abuse (and therefore the risk of using identityman-
agement systems) is quite low. Except for extreme, denial-
of-service cases the university does not suffer any di-
rect actual loss of non-students having access to the
resources. This is the same for any subscription based
digital service, like on-line music, or a digital newspa-
7per, etc. Because the marginal cost of the copy is essen-
tially zero, there is no direct loss if non-members have
access as well. The losses incurred by such services are
the result of fewer sales.
Granting access to business applications (and the
associated data in particular) has a higher risk profile.
Not because of loss of revenue, but because the data
is often confidential. It could cause enormous financial
damage when it becomes public. Similarly, there is a dif-
ference in risk level associated with granting access to a
bank account and granting access to an email account.
Recommendation The impact of dealing with different
types of resources on IdM deserves further study. For
instance, related distinctions one could make here are
on rivalry and durability of a resource. A rivalrous re-
source cannot be used at the same time by another
user, whereas access to a nonrival resource does not
exclude such access by others (cf. common property re-
sources). Durable resources do not degrade or get used
up, whereas non-durable do degrade or can be used only
once (cf. the difference between ’bits’ and ’atoms’). It
is interesting to explore the economic literature to see
whether even more types of resources and goods can
be discerned, and how they influence the trust assump-
tions in (and the risk of using) identity management.
3.3 Trust assumptions
We have been using the ambiguous concept of trust
in previous sections, without giving a definition. We
will not present a thorough discussion of the notion
of trust in this paper though, but refer to Hardin [17]
O’Hara [29] and others9. For our exposition the follow-
ing informal definition (taken from van den Broek and
Huijboom [37]) is sufficient:
When an actor trusts another actor, he or she is
willing to assume an open and vulnerable posi-
tion. He or she expects the other to refrain from
opportunistic behaviour even if there is the pos-
sibility to show this behaviour.
In more technical terms, entity A trusts entity B if B
can break the security or privacy policy of A without
A’s cooperation or knowledge. Similar definitions can
be found elsewhere (cf. [21]).
3.3.1 Building trust
Trust can only be built over time. For this, the RP needs
to be sure it is talking to the same entity (and the other
9 Lacohee, H. Crane, S. and Phippen, A. Trustguide: Final re-
port, at http://www.trustguide.org.uk.
way around) in different sessions. In order to do so,
both parties need to retain information from session
to session. Unfortunately, in many of the current IdM
systems, the User does not maintain any state. More-
over, the RP is completely relying on the IdP to ensure
that the link between different visits of the same user
is reliable10 (but see also [16]).
The "proof key" of CardSpace [26] does not solve
this: this only prevents an adversary to use a security
token it obtained illegally11. The binding is only guar-
anteed as long as the IdP is honest. If the IdP releases
the private proof key, or if it uses that proof key itself,
the UA is no longer involved.
The problem could be solved if the User Agent and
the Relying Party each store part of a key pair, and verify
the link directly without external help.
3.3.2 Trust assumptions are ill understood
By using an identity management system, one implic-
itly agrees to several complex, and poorly understood,
trust relationships between the parties that belong to
that identity management system. Some of the trust
relationships involved in identity management are the
side effect ofmore fundamental security and federation
problems, that we will discuss separately.
The user trusts the IdP not to act on its behalf without his
explicit consent. In many systems for identity manage-
ment, the IdP essentially does the logging in to a RP, on
behalf of a user. It could easily do so, without the user
even being present. Clearly the user does not want the
IdP to do this. The impact of this concern is unclear (an
IdP that betrays the trust of user is soon out of busi-
ness), but a fix to prevent this scenario is not difficult
to implement (see section 4.1). Additionally, the user
expects the IdP not to release personal information un-
less explicitly asked by RP and with the permission of
the user.
10 This is also a problem with current PKIs, where the RP also
does not keep state and trusts the certificate coming with an
authentication to ensure a long term binding between several
encounters with the same user over a long period of time.
11 It works as follows: the proof key pair is generated by the
IdP. The IdP sends the private proof key to the User Agent (UA),
encrypted using the public key of the UA. The public part is also
sent to the User Agent, together with the security token. The en-
tiremessage is signed by the IdP. Using the private key it received
earlier, the UA generates a signature over this combination of to-
ken and public proof key, and sends that to the RP. The signature
proves to the RP that the UA knows the corresponding private
proof key.
8The relying party trusts the IdP not to extend the circle
of trust (without his consent). Depending on the appli-
cation, a RP may rely on an IdP to provide him with at-
tributes regarding the user accessing the service. Based
on these attributes the RP may decide to grant the user
access or not. A common example is granting access
to a wireless campus network to all students, including
those that come from other universities. In this appli-
cation, the IdP will tell the network whether the user is
a student or not. The circle of trust could be extended
when a new university wants to join the scheme. In this
case the IdP will delegate the responsibility to classify
the new members as students to the newly connected
IdP, and forward this classification as its own to all RPs
that connect to it. Based on the decision of this new,
and unknown, IdP the network (by necessity) will grant
these users access to its network. The decision to grant
access to a user is thus in the hands of the new IdP,
which may be undesirable. See also section 4.4.
But there aremany other trust assumptions involved
in IdM. The most basic trust relationship underlying
identity management (and this is usually well under-
stood) is the following.
– The relying party trusts the IdP to make a particular
claim about a particular user.
However, the following trust relationship is equally im-
portant and fundamental, yet most people will not re-
alise this assumption is being made.
– The user allows the IdP to make a particular claim
about herself to a particular relying party, and al-
lows the relying party to accept such claims from
this IdP.
Note also, that these trust relationship are dynamic and
context dependent: a user may at some point decide to
no longer use the services of an identity provider, and
therefore the trust relationship no longer exists. More-
over, the user may only allow the relying party to ac-
cept certain claims from the identity provider within
a certain context. For example, if a user only accesses
a service fromwork, or during the day, the relying party
should not accept claims about the user during the night,
or when it appears the service is accessed from an In-
ternet kiosk.
Every trust assumption is a potential security prob-
lem, as the trusted party can break the security policy
of the other party. From a security point of view, it is
preferable to rely on as few trust assumptions as pos-
sible.
Recommendation A better understanding of the trust
assumptions among the parties involved in an identity
management system is needed. More implicit or explicit
trust assumptions should be collected and studied, and
it should be determined whether they can by mitigated
or avoided by other (e.g. technical) means.
4 Security issues
Current identity management frameworks have imple-
mented techniques, methods, and policies to securely
handle identity information. However, several vulnera-
bilities remain.
4.1 The IdP is a single point of failure.
Identity management systems require the user and the
relying party to place a large amount of trust in the
IdP (see also Sect. 3.3). A wealth of identity information
is stored at IdPs, and users can do nothing but simply
trust the IdP to preserve their privacy and properly se-
cure their identity information [14]. But still, mistakes
can be made and privacy-sensitive information can be-
come public12. Thismakes the identity provider a single
point of failure.
Possibly even more worrisome is the fact that in
most current identity management systems the IdP has
all information it needs to log in at related RPs as a
registered user. This means that anyone that has ac-
cess to this information at the IdP can log in as a user
at the related RPs: For example employees of the com-
pany hosting the IdP, or hackers that break into the IdP
systems. Depending on the service, the impostor could
order things to make the legitimate user pay money,
transfer money from the user’s bank account, or get
insight into personal information, such as the user’s
electronic health record. The RP has no means to dis-
tinguish the impostor from the real user.
This feature can also be (ab)used to turn an IdM sys-
tem into a system for mass surveillance. If the identity
provider happens to be the government (and many gov-
ernments offer IdP services and actively try to extend
their use in other domains), then the government has
immediate access to all your data stored at services that
accept this IdP. Using such an IdP to manage your iden-
tity at your bank, your ISP, or other relying parties is
not recommended in such systems.
The possibly large collection of data stored at an IdP
can also be used to perpetrate identity fraud. If infor-
mation about a user stored at the IdP becomes public
due to e.g. theft, hacking or implementation flaws, this
12 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, “Chronology of Data
Breaches” http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach.
9data can be used to fake an identity when registering
for a new service.
The impact of this issue increases as more andmore
systems get federated and a single IdP is used to access
a large number of services. Such an IdP may abuse its
powers, maliciously accessing many services, before a
user notices. If the RP and the IdP do not properly log
authentication requests and access control decisions,
both the RP and the IdP may claim that the other party
was at fault, and the user will not have any evidence to
determine what actually happened.
Recommendation To prevent this issue it is necessary
to put the user in control of information that is re-
leased from the IdP [8], not only by policy, but techni-
cally enforced into the identity management system13.
It should not be possible for the IdP to log in to a RP
claiming to be another user. The identity management
system should enforce the requirement that the user
controls part of the data necessary to log in to the RP.
Cardspace [11] tries to achieve this using the concept of
a Private Personal Identifier (PPID) [2], and the use of a
proof key (cf. Sect. 3.3.1). This does not solve the prob-
lem completely, because the server needs to remember
the associated public keys in order to detect spoofing
attempts using the same PPID but with freshly gener-
ated key pairs. Also, this approach breaks the 8th law
of identity (see section 6.1, and [8]) on location inde-
pendence as a special user agent needs to be installed
on the user’s PC.
4.2 The risk of phishing is increased
Most current identity management systems only pro-
vide a way to authenticate the user, but it is not possible
for the user to authenticate the IdP or the RP [14]. This
is a necessity to be able to prevent phishing attacks,
where attackers trick users into revealing identity data
and credentials. With identity management becoming
more wide-spread, phishing attacks based on getting
IdP login credentials will most likely increase as well.
When HTTP redirects are used (as for example in
OpenID 1.0) phishing attacks are even easier to launch14.
It is as simple as creating an illegitimate, but attractive,
website that redirects to a false copy of the IdP to cap-
ture the user’s credentials.
13 Other systems allow for users to give their approval and
store that approval as a policy setting at the IdP. An example
is uApprove, an optional extension for Shibboleth. uApprove is
not location dependent, but has its own limitations: it is optional,
and the control over that tool and its data (e.g. stored user con-
sents) still resides at the IdP.
14 M. Slot, “Beginner’s guide to OpenID phishing”, http://
marcoslot.net/apps/openid/, retrieved in December 2008.
Fig. 3 Yahoo! sign-in seal to protect against phishing.
An example countermeasure to phishing attacks us-
ing fake IdP websites is Yahoo! sign-in seal15 (see Fig-
ure 3). This is a personalised image or short text phrase
that will appear each time a user logs in to a Yahoo!
web page from the same computer the seal was created
on. The presence of the seal enables the user to distin-
guish the real Yahoo! sign-in page from a false page.
This solution only works if the user logs in using the
same computer as the seal was created on, as Yahoo!
identifies it by storing tags in multiple places on the
computer16.
Recommendation To prevent phishing attacks it is very
important that users can (and will) authenticate the RP
and the IdP. Mutual authentication therefore needs to
be incorporated in identity management systems, in
such a way that the user is not required to install spe-
cial software or to use one and the same computer all
the time (as is the case with Yahoo! sign-in seal and Mi-
crosoft Cardspace). Furthermore, authentication of the
IdP and RP by the user should be more user friendly
than checking their SSL certificatemanually. There does
not appear to be a single, usable, and secure fix to pre-
vent phishing in all cases.
4.3 What is the optimal size of a key chain? – or – How
many identities should a user have?
One of themain advantages of identitymanagement for
end-users is single-sign on: not having to remember all
those user names and passwords, except for the log-
in-token for the IdP. From this perspective, it would be
great to have just one IdP: only one user name/password
(or another authentication token) and that’s it.
Of course, this is not feasible. Not only because users
may not trust that one IdP to have access to all their
services (see section 4.1). Even if users do trust a single
15 https://protect.login.yahoo.com/.
16 “How does Yahoo Sign In Seal Work?”, blog, retrieved De-
cember 2008, http://girishnayak.blogspot.com/2006/09/
how-does-yahoo-sign-in-seal-work.html.
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IdP for that, using only one IdP means that if that IdP
is compromised, all identity data is compromised im-
mediately as well. It is therefore advisable for users to
distribute their identity information over multiple IdPs.
Furthermore, different RPs will require different IdPs.
Financial institutions for example have other require-
ments and preferences than car rental agencies with
respect to an IdP. The first may want to set up their own
IdP to be able to control the security of authentication,
while the latter is satisfied with using a third-party IdP.
Can we then settle for one IdP for personal use, one for
work, and one for each financial institution? This seems
to be a workable yet quite arbitrary subdivision.
The question is: how many identity providers does
a user need? What is the best compartmentalisation of
the digital identity mess? We need to understand the
advantages and risks of using a certain amount and dis-
tribution of IdPs and federations, in terms of security,
usability, and business.
Recommendation To be able to determine which and
how many “identities” are optimal, a model that cap-
tures these relevant aspects needs to be developed. To
our knowledge such a model does not exist yet.
4.4 Federations are risky
In cross domain settings, one organisation may assign
roles to certain individuals, while another organisation
assigns access rights to roles. This is typically done
in federation settings: one university classifies certain
people as students of that university, while other RPs
rely on that classification tomediate access to resources
like the library, classes, or the student restaurant.
This gives rise to a compliance defect [15]: the IdP
may interpret the semantics of the role (e.g. when some-
one classifies as a student) differently from the RP, which
leads to a situation where a person gets access to a ser-
vice that he or she is not supposed to access. The re-
verse (being denied access) is a problem as well.
The above is an instance of a more general issue.
Traditionally, access to a resource or service is medi-
ated through a “reference monitor” [23]. In an iden-
tity management system, this reference monitor is in
a sense distributed over several parties. The underly-
ing question is how to do this “split”. In the simplest
case, this question surfaces as the question “where to
keep the access rights”.
A separate issue is the control over the so-called
Circle-of-Trust (CoT). By establishing a federation among
several IdPs, the CoT is similarly extended. RPs con-
nected to a certain IdP may have limited control over
this, and therefore have limited control over the risks
that they are exposed to because of the extension of the
CoT.
Recommendation When implementing or joining an iden-
tity federation, RPs need to carefully consider where
to keep and maintain the access rights. Moreover, they
need to judge the consequences when the CoT is ex-
tended without their knowledge or consent.
5 Privacy issues
Identity management systems are used to facilitate mil-
lions of user transactions on the net each day. They
mediate between user and relying party, handle a lot
of personal information, and often register who does
business with whom. This has obvious privacy conse-
quences. We discuss these issues in detail below.
5.1 Linkability across domains
Like AdSense17 andDoubleClick18, identitymanagement
systems have the potential to track a single user over
all the websites he or she visits.
To maintain privacy, it should be possible for users
to be anonymous or use pseudonyms at RPs, and to
choose IdPs that do not link all user transactions at
all RPs together, and so do not keep records of every-
thing each user has been doing. Many identity manage-
ment systems implement at least part of these solu-
tions, which is why the UK Information Commissioner
has recognised Federated Access Management as a Pri-
vacy Enhancing Technology19
However, not all identity management systems do.
An example is DigiD, the Dutch national authentication
provider that enables authentication of Dutch citizens
when communicating with Dutch government institu-
tions. DigiD uses the BSN (Burger Service Number) to
identify a user: after authentication DigiD sends the
BSN to the RP. This number uniquely identifies each
user, and does not allow for anonymity or pseudonymity
at all. As indicated in [28], expanding the scope of DigiD
to incorporate not only governmental organisations but
also the private sector has many advantages. However,
as already mentioned, in its current form DigiD does
not allow for pseudonymity as the BSN is always used as
identifier. Such extension of use of DigiD for the private
17 https://www.google.com/adsense/
18 http://www.doubleclick.com
19 See http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/
library/data\_protection/detailed\_specialist\
_guides/privacy\_enhancing\_technologies\_v2.pdf
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sector is not acceptable as it violates the user’s privacy
when all RPs always receive the BSN as user identifier,
thereby always knowing exactly who the user is.
Another example stems from the need to retain user
permissions at RPs when a user moves from one home
organisation (and thus IdP) to another. Federations of-
ten solve this by implementing one static user attribute
(often a pseudonym identifier) that a user can ’bring’ to
another IdP. This ’feature’ severely limits the privacy of
users, as the static attribute links all user actions at all
its previous and current IdPs, and one (but often many
RPs).
This also involves a paradigm shift in the applica-
tions relying on identity management. It has become
standard practice to require a user to identify herself
before granting access to a service. In many cases this
is unnecessary. For example, in order to be allowed to
buy alcohol, someone only need to prove that he or she
is over 16 years old (or 18 or 21, depending on local
laws). Such ’attribute’ or ’credential’ based forms of pri-
vacy friendly identity management do exist in theory
but are rarely applied in practice [5].
Recommendation Whenever using identitymanagement
systems, one should always try to implementmaximum
anonymity and pseudonymity where possible. A solu-
tion for expanding DigiD to the private sector is to use
pseudonyms that are based onDigiD as identifiers. Each
user will have a different pseudonym with each RP, and
no pseudonym should leak any information about the
underlying BSN. A possiblemethod for generating pseu-
donyms is making a hash of the BSN. Alternatively, if it
needs to be possible to trace the pseudonym back to
the original BSN, different encryption methods can be
used [28]. Furthermore, a privacy friendly method for
retaining access rights at RPs when changing IdP is nec-
essary.
5.2 IdP knows all user transactions
In current identity management systems the IdP is in-
volved each time a user authenticates at a RP. There-
fore the IdP can keep track of all these user actions
(although sometimes the specific RP involved may be
kept hidden from the IdP). In most systems the user is
not even involved in the exchange of his identity infor-
mation between IdP and RP. But even in a claim-based
identity management system such as Cardspace, where
the user needs to give consent before identity informa-
tion is transferred, even though the IdP does not need
to know exactly who the RP is, the IdP often needs to
generate the assertion on-line and therefore knows of
all user transactions.
It seems PKI is the solution to this issue. Here a
Certificate Authority (CA) identifies and authenticates
a user only once, and then certifies the user’s public
key. The user can then authenticate himself to a RP
by signing data with his private key, which the RP can
verify using the corresponding public key. In this case
the CA is not directly involved in the user authentica-
tion by the RP, but is still the trusted third party. The
main downside of this solution is the necessity for the
user to always have his private key certificate available
when logging in, and thus PKI identity management vio-
lates the 8th Law of Identity (see section 6.1). Also Iden-
tity Selectors, as used in Cardspace, violate the 8th Law
of Independence, as all identity selection solutions are
hardware-specific, OS-specific or even browser-specific.
Recommendation We need to develop an identity man-
agement system that does not require IdPs to see all
user transactions, without violating the 8th Law of Iden-
tity. This apparent paradox may be solvable by relying
on personal hardware (like tokens, smart cards), or be
developing mobile identity management concepts.
5.3 Proportionality and subsidiarity often violated
In the EU, most of the data protection or privacy laws
are based on the principle of proportionality and sub-
sidiarity. Proportionality stipulates that the amount of
personal data being collected is proportional to the goal
for which it is being collected. Subsidiarity demands
that the same goal cannot be achieved in a more pri-
vacy friendly way.
Often, websites and services violate these principles.
You do not need to know someones identity to deter-
mine his age. Subscriptions for a service can certainly
be handled anonymously. An on-line newspaper does
not need to know who accesses the system, all it needs
to know is whether that person is entitled to read the
news on-line.
Recommendation Less is more. RPs should be precise
about the personal information required to offer a ser-
vice, and should not ask for more information “just be-
cause they can”. Think about anonymous ways to offer
the same service.
6 Usability issues
Although many identity management systems claim to
be designed with the user in mind, most still have im-
portant usability issues. We discuss those issues in this
section.
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6.1 The 8th Law of Identity: Location Independence
The seven laws of identity [8] present a compelling set
of requirements a system for identitymanagementmust
satisfy. However, one important usability aspect ismiss-
ing, which we pose as the 8th law of identity:
Definition 1 (Location Independence) The identity sys-
tem must allow a user to create, manage, and use his
identity independently of his current location and cur-
rent device in use.
A user should be able to access a RP using the identity
management systemnot only fromhis PC, but also from
a computer at a cybercafé in Hong Kong.
Recommendation Identitymanagement systems should
not rely on any persistent data stored locally at the
user’s machine. Note that this recommendation contra-
dicts some of the other recommendations in this paper.
Exceptions to this rule could be hardware tokens that
can easily be carried with you to achieve higher levels
of authentication.
6.2 “Who am I today?”
As discussed in section 3.1, usersmay have several iden-
tities, even within a single scope. This distinction in
identities manifests itself when people have several dif-
ferent responsibilities, or, in other words, may have sev-
eral different “roles”. Examples may help to clarify this
issue.
When signing a document, a notary can choose to
sign this as a notary, or as a private person. The distinc-
tion is legally significant. The CFO of a company may
use an electronic banking system either to enter a per-
sonal or a business transaction. An ICT system admin-
istrator may sign in to a system either as “root” (which
allows him to run OS-level applications and scripts) or
as an ordinary system user (that allows him to only ex-
ecute end-user applications).
We see that users can have different roles that allow
them to do different things within a certain service. Fur-
thermore, the impact of user actions depends on their
role: a signature of an accountant or a notary represents
more legal value.
Current identity management systems do not make
it easy for users to manage such different roles (al-
though, to be fair, exceptions exist [11]). Basically, users
are forced to maintain and manage several identifiers
to separate these roles. But this may lead to confusion.
For instance, if a user has previously signed in at its IdP
using a particular identity, and the user and the service
support single sign-on, the user may automatically be
signed in using this same identity when accessing a dif-
ferent service some time later. This is potentially dan-
gerous: if the CFO signed in as CFO earlier, he may not
want to execute a personal transaction while still being
signed in as CFO.
Depending on the type of service, actions performed
in a certain role may be visible to others that can also
access that role, or result in information sent to the
organisation that is responsible for that role. For exam-
ple, all communication of the president of the USA is
kept for later reference. The same goes for many trans-
actions performed when doing business. In these situa-
tions privacy sensitive information can become public,
such as the purchase of personal books, visiting certain
websites, or the rental of a hotel room, when the role
that was selected to execute those actions happened to
be a business role.
Formany current identitymanagement systems these
very common usage scenarios pose a problem. There
is no way to indicate as which role, or which identity,
a user wants to access a particular service, especially
if he has accessed that system in both capacities be-
fore. One of those identities may be selected automat-
ically (in a single-sign-on context), most likely without
the user knowing why, or how to change it.
Recommendation Identitymanagement systems should
provide a way for users to see and select their identity
with which they “sign in” even if explicitly signing in is
not asked for, because the user has already authenti-
cated with an IdP that is recognised by the RP. Asking
users each time which role (at which IdP) they want to
use is cumbersome for the user, and therefore not a
good solution to this issue. So alternative approaches
need to be investigated.
6.3 When complex transactions require multiple
credentials
A special case of the previous issue is that of trans-
actions that require the cooperation of many services,
possibly of multiple RPs. This is for example the case in
Service Oriented Architectures (SOAs), where one appli-
cation consists of multiple software services. The prob-
lem arises if the user needs to present credentials for
more than one service, and the credentials depend on
the role the user assumes. The user needs to have all the
credentials required to perform the transaction, but can
only present them if he logged in using the right role.
Also in this situation the user has no means to select
his role or identity for a particular session.
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Recommendation Clearly this is part of a more gen-
eral problem of implementing chains of transactions,
in which identity management plays a role only par-
tially. But perhaps identity management systems could
provide a way to automatically determine the full set of
required credentials, and the minimal role the user can
assume that covers those credentials.
6.4 User profile management
When a user accesses a service, this often involves the
processing of personal information. Some of that infor-
mation may be stored at the IdP, while other informa-
tion is stored at the RP, as it is service specific and the
RP needs the information for e.g. marketing research,
or because the RP does not trust the IdP to store the re-
quired information instead. More often than not, many
RPs store the same information for a particular user.
How can such a scattered profile be managed and be
kept up to date by a user? This could be useful for
instance to allow a user to update his address every
time he moves. Should a user always be allowed to up-
date such information (consider for example medical
records)? The question is whether identitymanagement
systems will be able to simplify user profile manage-
ment both for the end users as well as the RPs and IdPs.
Recommendation This issue is resolved by following
the emerging trend towards the convergence of profile,
identity, and authorisation (or access)management into
a single system for identitymanagement. Such a system
would also be beneficiary for users, as it allows them to
manage personalisation of many different services in
a central location. This way, changing a single setting
once will change the behaviour of all services consis-
tently. This enables a ubiquitous personal experience
across many different services.
Note however that although identity management
is positioned as solution for the cumbersome main-
tenance of identity information, the nature of certain
business (see Sect. 4.4) and the nature of identity itself
(as discussed in Sect. 3.1) limits the implementation of
management of identity information across organisa-
tional domains.
7 Conclusions & Recommendations
Identity management not only comprises identification
and authentication, but also access management and
user profile management. Stakeholders such as end-
users and relying parties require identity management
systems to be able to span multiple organisations, to
be user-friendly, privacy friendly, and secure. Current
systems for identity management are not able to ac-
complish this.
As we have seen in this paper, security and privacy
are not adequately addressed in current identity man-
agement solutions. This renders current systems for
federated identity management inapplicable for ’high-
value’ services like electronic banking, that consequently
remain to rely on their own home-grown systems for ac-
cess control.
Federation, as well as the more fundamental con-
cept of identity, and its consequences regarding scope,
responsibility and trust, is still not understood. More
fundamentally, the term federation is used confusingly
within the field. This should be avoided.
The issues of identitymanagement systems presented
in the paper cause the current identity crisis. In order to
resolve the identity crisis, we recommend to follow up
on the following main observations made in this paper.
– Apropermodel for identity underlying identityman-
agement should be developed, and IdPs andRPs should
make explicit how that model applies to their sys-
tems of identity management.
– Building on that model, the trust relationships be-
tween the parties using an identitymanagement should
be investigated and formalised.
– To prevent phishing attacks it is very important that
users can (and will) authenticate the RP and the IdP.
Mutual authentication therefore needs to be incor-
porated in identity management systems, in such a
way that the user is not required to install special
software or to use one and the same computer all
the time
– To enhance user privacy we recommend that users
can remain anonymous or use pseudonyms at RPs,
and to have IdPs that do not link all user transac-
tions at all RPs together. Although identity manage-
ment systems already implement at least part of
these solutions, not all do so. We need an identity
management system that does not allow IdPs to see
all user transactions, without violating the 8th Law
of Location Independence (which states that identity
management systems should not rely on any persis-
tent data stored locally at the user’s machine).
– Identity management systems should provide a way
for users to see and select their identity with which
they “sign in” even if explicitly signing in is not asked
for.
– Identity management systems should provide a way
to automatically determine the full set of required
credentials for a certain service, and the minimal
role the user can assume that covers those creden-
tials.
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– Finally, we need identity management systems that
put the user back into control and that support the
user in maintaining a user profile that can be used
(in a controlled manner) by business from several
organisational domains.
Most of these recommendations are not trivial, and
to implement them requires a substantial research, de-
velopment, and standardisation effort. Moreover, to re-
solve the identity crisis stakeholders need to work to-
gether on this.We believe the growing need for a proper,
well-founded, identitymanagement solution legitimates
the effort.
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